Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) a acks are now 20 years old; what has changed in that time? eir disruptive presence, their volume, distribution across the globe, and the relative ease of launching them have all been trending in favor of a ackers. Our increases in network capacity and our architectural design principles are making our online world richer, but are favoring a ackers at least as much as Internet services.
INTRODUCTION
What has happened in the last 20 years: In 1999, a set of compromised computers, called Trin00 [9] , took down a network at the University of Minnesota; and volumetric Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) a acks were born. Many changes, enhancements, and evolutions to our mitigation technologies have happened since then, but are we demonstrably be er off today (now 20 years later)? Trin00 used hundreds (and actually may have been composed of thousands) of compromised machines ("bots"). Today, conventional bot-network ("botnet") sizes have been seen in the millions. By today's standards, Trin00 may not sound like a large botnet. However, size is not all that matters. In some cases, smaller (well-provisioned) botnets have hit harder than any before (e.g. the Mirai botnet a acks [4] ). A acks like those from Mirai illustrate that the size of a botnet is not the sole determining factor in the damage it can do. Another, perhaps archival, lesson is that historical a ack sizes are relative, and raw numbers alone don't tell the tale. Moore's law and bandwidth increases make comparing a ack volumes (bits-per-second, bps) from the past to today an apples to oranges comparison. Gigabit a acks in 2000 were considered staggering, but only because they rivaled provisioned capacity of services and carriers of the time. An unfortunate state of affairs is (and has been for the last 20 years) that it is easier to gain a ack capacity (i.e. compromised hosts and aggregate a ack bandwidth) than it is to gain defensive capacity. Moreover, during the last 20 years, our remediation strategies have not fundamentally evolved as a acks have been swelling in size and complexity. e state-of-the art in the DDoS defense industry still centralizes our defenses (in "scrubbing" centers) against growing distributed a acks. In short, what was true then is still true now: DDoS is an asymmetric threat with impedance mismatch between a ackers and defenders, which strongly indicates the need to reexamine the principles that underlie the problem-space. Victims of our architecture's success: Internet protocols have long been designed to abstract decisions and operations away from each other to foster heterogeneity, scalability, encapsulated functions, and more. At the same time, DDoS a acks have evolved to using Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs) at and above the network layers (at the application-level).
is has, as a consequence of our layered abstraction model, hidden DDoS semantics from the transport and network layers. As defenders against DDoS a acks, our fundamental challenge is the onus to tear apart a ack traffic from legitimate traffic, where the distinction is o en only visible at the application layer, and conventionally encrypted there. A recent operational report of largescale measurements stated "SSL [sic] is majority of traffic in [North America] by 2019" [22] .
e necessary computational complexity, the volume of traffic, and the growing use of encryption o en render common operational network tools ineffective in defending against a acks. What's more, some operational observations infer that the deployment of necessary security protections has been limited "Where there is no clear early adopter advantage" [17] .
In facing the distributed threat of DDoS, our distributed network should be our greatest countermeasure, but how without applicationlevel inspection of traffic? For example, how should a networklevel management tool determine which of a stream of DNS queries are real and which are participating in a reflector a ack [15] ? Or, which NTP command is legitimate and which is part of an a ack [11] ?
Or, is a memcached query from a real application or part of an attack [6] ? Or, which HTTP client is trying to keep a needed connection alive and which is starving the server for resources [29] . Today, it is hard for either the network-layer or the transport-layer to mount an effective defense because they do not have policy semantics that can encode diverse application-level nuances. DDoS mitigation is necessarily done using Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and, therefore, only a er centralizing distributed a ack traffic. is impedance mismatch, distributed a ack versus centralized mitigation, is further complicated when application payloads are "embedded" (e.g. encrypted) and require multiple layers of complicated and expensive "decoding. " For example, performing DPI on an HTTPS flow requires decryption of the flow, but that requires escrow of the end-site's TLS private key (to terminate and inspect the embedded flow). Internet protocol layering, coupled with the end-to-end principle, has made it difficult to shut down the DDoS floodgate because bad traffic cannot easily be filtered out at the network layer alone. In short, we have been losing the DDoS war, and it is time to ask why and investigate the fundamentals of this problem-space.
In this article, we want to sound an alarm that we must take corrective action. We posit that the research community is ideally suited to formulate and investigate fundamental questions about how we got here. For example, are there foundational issues in our network architecture that fundamentally enable DDoS a acks? How can our network infrastructure be enhanced to address the principles that enable the DDoS problem? In order to reap the gains of our work, how can we incentivize the development and deployment of necessary changes? To move our defensive posture forward we need to take a fresh look at the problem and consider fresh approaches.
is article is structured as follows: to illustrate how dire our situation is, we provide a brief background, then propose a few ways to categorize the "state of the union" of DDoS a acks: architecturally, volumetrically, and economically. We then take a closer look at the fundamental nature and state of DDoS a acks, today. From there, we discuss modern mitigation techniques in the DDoS defense industry (e.g. "scrubbing"), before concluding with a discussion.
DDOS BACKGROUND
ere is not one type of DDoS, there are a variety. Some are called "low-and-slow, " which starve servers of resources, and can be hard to detect. Some are volumetric, which send overwhelming amounts of traffic that congest network links and overload servers and are hard to stop even though they are detectable by nature. ere is a large body of literature that broadly proposes DDoS taxonomies [5, 18, 27] . Much of the prior work has included more than just DDoS a acks, themselves, but also categorized malcode ecosystem aspects like implementation details, malcode behavioral differences, the infection vectors, and also the a ack TTPs involved in DDoS a acks. In order to highlight the status of our war on DDoS, we focus on addressing operational aspects of DDoS a acks: their natures, their traffic, and detecting and remediating them. Of the many types of DDoS a acks and TTPs, we briefly describe a couple common generalized examples: volumetric and resource starvation. 1 
Volumetric DDoS, today
Large volumes of DDoS a ack traffic (sometimes called "packet love"), generally require service providers to invest in very expensive infrastructure and network bandwidth (capacity). In volumetric DDoS, the largest recorded DDoS a acks have all been stateless and have capitalized on the ability to spoof (or "lie about") the source addresses of their a ack traffic. As just a couple of examples: in 2016, the first publicity around a terabit a ack came from an a ack on krebsonline.com [20] ) and it was able to reach this volume through its use of source address spoofing in a reflector a ack. Not long a er that in 2016, a larger a ack on Dyn [25] surpassed this volume, again using source address spoofing. In short, the TTPs of the largest DDoS a acks seen today rely heavily on being able to spoof addresses (even if that is just to leverage an online service for an amplification factor).
While this is not a new type of DDoS, the increasingly relative ease of acquiring the disruptive power of large volume a ack sources has elevated the appeal of stateless DDoS a acks to adversaries. Spoofed datagrams may be Domain Name System (DNS) queries, Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) queries, Network Time Protocol (NTP) queries, memcached queries, or others. Some stateless a acks may also be spoofed control traffic for TCP connections (not reflected traffic). For example, TCP SYN packets that have spoofed source addresses and large data payloads [37] (even though SYN packets are not permi ed to carry data on setup [34] ).
Resource Exhaustion Attacks
While many headlines focus on the largest DDoS a acks seen, and in recent years, those have all tended to be stateless, there continue to be many instances of a acks that leverage protocol aspects in the Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), or even at the HTTP layer (which might be using HTTPS). ese attacks can be crippling without a DDoS defense system, but they do not result in headlines as o en as their volumetric counterparts. While these a acks don't approach the volumetric scale of reflector a acks, resource exhaustion a acks allow a ackers to bring Internet services down with far fewer resources.
One of the early examples of this was an a ack called Slowloris [16] in which a relatively small number of stateful HTTP queries would hold connections open on webservers and thereby exhaust their ability to answer other (legitimate) clients. Other exhaustion attacks exploit TLS' cryptographic key negotiation [8] . In these types of a acks, the raw numbers of a acking clients and traffic are not as spectacular as volumetric DDoS, but (perhaps more troubling) is the fact that their detection and remediation more clearly requires additional state information above the network layer.
Detection vs. Remediation:
An important distinction in the DDoS war is the difference between detection and remediation. e techniques to detect a DDoS o en are very different that remediating it. Moreover, detection and remediation are not always addressed in the same places in the network, or even by the same service provider. One common mode of operation is for an online service to detect that it is under DDoS a ack (of some kind), and to then engage a DDoS mitigation provider. We discuss this in more detail in Section 4, a er we first discuss the DDoS State of the Union.
STATE OF THE UNION
Assessment: are we winning, or losing? ere are many ways one could evaluate the state of the union with respect to DDoS. Here, we use three example perspectives to categorize ways in which our status could be evaluated: (1) architectural (2) volumetric (3) economic.
ese are not meant to be the canonical set, a complete set, or to be a formal framework. Rather, these are simply used to help illustrate aspects of the DDoS defense ecosystem.
Architectural State of the Union
Technologically, not much has fundamentally changed for defenders, but a lot has changed for the a ackers. Our reliance on DPI for detecting and remediating a ack traffic has resulted in increasing dependence on keeping our defenses in centralized approaches (relative to DDoS sources). For example, with reflector a acks leveraging application-level semantics, and the increased use of Transport Layer Security (TLS), terminating and interpreting traffic has necessitated backhauling traffic to DPI, or "scrubbing, " centers. ere, the tools used by defenders have incrementally evolved, but our approaches have not. What's more, this has framed an architectural asymmetry: large volumes of a ack traffic (more sources with increasingly be er provisioned networks) vs. central remediation.
is is particularly worrisome in the face of the increased complexity of web applications and their increased use of encryption. ese o en demand that a remediation engine act as an endpoint in a network flow.
e architecture of today's DDoS mitigation techniques is centered around machines (or network appliances) that inspect traffic, both generally and at the applicationlevel. As a result, our mitigation techniques are predicated on matching mitigation bandwidth to ever-growing aggregate distributed a ack volumes, and that is (at best) a band-aid solution. is observation has echoed if different ways, and in different places for some time. For example, in 2015, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced a call for Extreme DDoS Defense (XD3) that included a solicitation to "[disperse] cyber assets (physically and/or logically)" [12] .
Some existing a empts towards dispersing network-based remediation, such as BGP's FlowSpec [26] , Remote Triggered BackHoling (RTBH) [21] , etc. a empt to coordinate distributed defenses by pushing remediation information to the network-layer. However, without the necessary application-level expressiveness, this can unfortunately lead to collateral damage to well-behaving sources contained within the same network prefix as a ackers, non-a ack traffic that is sourced from compromised devices, etc., and has arguably limited adoption of these protocols and techniques.
Volumetric State of the Union
Considering the volumetric state of the union (volumes of a ack traffic vs. carriers/providers provisioned capacities) paints a similarly disconcerting picture. Service Providers (SPs) buy transit in Gigabit per second links (Gbps) in multiple locations from multiple carriers. Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) and carrier capacity are also o en offered in Gbps. Large carriers' global aggregate capacity may approach (and in some cases achieves) Terabits per second (Tbps), but this does not mean any given ingress point to a carrier's network is (itself) a Tbps link. Generally, aggregate capacity in Tbps is summation of router/regional capacities (Gbps). Consider, even routers' linecards only reach 100 Gbps, but aggregate a ack traffic of the largest DDoS a acks is already over 1 Tbps. In an aggregate view, a recent observation from operational measurements quotes that "a acks [are] growing in size faster than network growth. " [22] Moreover, the aggregate capacity ma ers far less than if this capacity exists near all a ack sources. O en, it is all but guaranteed that aggregate capacity is not near a ack sources, and it can often be topologically very far from a ack sources. " e Internetfis capacity a enuates the total throw weight a DDoS a ack can generate; the farther a target is from components of a network, the less traffic that will make it across any congested links between the target and the a ack source" [2] . is can (and o en does) result in service degradation and outages to other Internet services, whose traffic shares congested routing infrastructure (i.e. collateral damage).
When a ack sources are topologically far from mitigation, their traffic is backhauled across transit and peering infrastructure to scrubbing centers.
is has the effect of centralizing distributed a ack traffic for mitigation, and draws terabits of a ack traffic to (in some cases) gigabit scrubbing centers. Even in the case of high-capacity scrubbing centers, the current state of affairs is that a distributed a ack is necessarily remediated in a (relatively) more centralized mitigation infrastructure. e largest DDoS a acks that we have seen are already larger than the provisioned capacity of many (if not most) of the large providers and carriers' capacities. In 2016, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) started a program called DDoS Defense (DDoSD), whose starting position was, "one day" DDoS could swell to 1 Tbps [13] . By 2017, the largest DDoS a acks had already reached that, and in 2018 DDoS a acks quantifiably exceeded that.
Economic State of the Union
Using money as a canary-in-the-coalmine, service providers' outlay to protect against DDoS also paints a grim picture. In 2000, DDoS a acks on Yahoo, eBay, and several other major Internet services led the news and raised alarms. Now, almost 20 years later, protection rackets exist in gaming spheres. Online gaming and gambling sites are frequently held hostage for ransom by DDoS threats [24] , and sometimes a acks are launched simply in order to gain gaming advantages [32] . More generally, today, all online services need DDoS protection, and companies expect to pay for for defensive protections against inevitable DDoS a acks. e DDoS mitigation market was $1.94 billion in 2018, and is growing [35] .
What's more, there has also been a DDoS-for-hire (i.e. "booter") grey-market for roughly a decade [33, 38] ! Internet services need protection, but there is no official remedy to DDoS. So we must pay for help. In a sense, we have privatized our police force (i.e. the DDoS mitigation marketplace).
DDOS SCRUBBING
Detecting an a ack (versus other abnormal, but benign, traffic) can be critical, especially if a service provider intends to use a DDoS mitigation service to remediate a acks. Under "peace-time" conditions, services are o en provisioned to handle expected load and user behavior, periodic above-average "bursts" of traffic, slow TLS handshakes, and other suboptimal client behaviors. Once an a ack is detected, the subsequent remediation is very o en done by applying application-level semantics to packets and/or packet flows.
ese semantics allow remediation to inspect and "scrub" a ack traffic off of legitimate traffic.
Why scrubbing
A er DDoS traffic is "scrubbed" away, the remaining ("good") traffic is then delivered to applications. Scrubbing uses techniques that range from measuring traffic heuristics to any number of vendorspecific techniques that assess veracity of traffic and approaches address both stateless and stateful a ack TTPs. Scrubbing, therefore, necessarily must have the ability to detect application-layer a acks and discern them from normal traffic (even if that normal traffic is just higher volume than usual). Some commercial solutions for on-premises mitigation appliances are Netscout's Arbor, Radware, and A10 Networks [1, 30, 36] .
Traffic sources (either remote networks or specific remote hosts) might be sending both proper application traffic and DDoS traffic. For example, a single large home-access network (under a single routed BGP prefix) might have well-functioning hosts transacting with a website, and separate compromised hosts (bots) sending DDoS traffic (possibly some hosts sending both a ack and nona ack traffic).
is can make remediation difficult; for example, is a UDP packet a legitimate DNS query, or a legitimate NTP query, or is it a SYN packet that is actually trying to setup a TCP connection, or a legitimate TLS 1.3 0-RTT resumption? In these types of situations, it can be very hard to separate a ack traffic from non-a ack traffic, solely at the network/transport layers. Some a acks require multiple round trips with a source to distinguish, and defenders are often very adverse to dropping legitimate traffic (false positives). In order to discern a ack traffic from non-a ack traffic, especially as TTPs continue to become more complex, remediation o en occurs by assessing application-level semantics of traffic. is is precisely the remit of "scrubbing" appliances. eir job is to "scrub" a acks out of, and forward on only, legitimate traffic.
is unavoidable complexity is precisely why scrubbing is the industry's last line of defense. While approaches like FlowSpec, RTBH, and the IETF's new working group on DDoS Open reat Signaling (dots) [28] are all a empting to enhance the network/transport layer to aid in DDoS defense, scrubbing centers catch all DDoS attacks that get through. 2 Because discerning the difference between a traffic burst and an a ack can be difficult (and time is o en of the essence), some Internet services engage an "always-on" mitigation provider (sending all traffic through mitigation machinery, even during peace-time), so that detection and mitigation can both be handled together, with high confidence and low latency.
State of the art: scrubbing centers
Whether scrubbing appliances are deployed deeply in carrier networks' cores, or in services providers that draw traffic in, they represent a relatively centralized solution to DDoS' distributed threat. Sites that have a lot of bandwidth and specialized hardware and/or so ware are called scrubbing centers, and some companies offer these as a commercial service (Mitigation as a Service, MaaS) [3, 10, 31] . While mitigation appliances are sold to SPs, and can be deployed in any network for self-protection, mitigation providers quantifiably offer more utility than trying to detect and remediate DDoS on one's own. Mitigation providers will have already invested in large transit and peering capacities (o en in excess of 1 Tbps, in aggregate), will have deployed their infrastructure across the Internet at topologically diverse locations, likely have augmented mitigation appliances' technology with custom enhancements, will have 24/7 Security Operations Centers (SOCs) monitoring traffic, and likely also have in house (or retained the services of) cybersecurity threat intelligence teams. In short, the threats are such that is pays to pay for protection. While this may seem like a jagged pill to swallow, one of the benefits to this approach is it helps to instrument a acks in way that sometimes allows defenders (information security teams, incident response teams, etc.) to create profiles that can a ribute a acks to specific "families" of malcode, and occasionally even a ribute a acks to the actor(s) responsible. is is especially evident when one considers that large mitigation providers see a broader cross-section of a ack traffic, and this enables deeper analysis. Of course, is that a benefit of MaaS providers' positions, or an indication that our defenses are in need of basic research to overcome the inherent asymmetry between a ackers and victims?
SEARCHING FOR REMEDIATION
Fundamentals of the problem In the last 20 years of fighting DDoS, we have learned a lot, and a lot of insightful systems have been built to counter DDoS a acks. However, we have not fundamentally advanced our protections. In that time, we have greatly increased the bandwidth of our networks, but that has also benefited our a ackers. It has actually benefited them more because for every remediation instance that has more bandwidth (e.g. scrubbing centers, Internet service instances, redundant sites, etc.), so too does every a acking bot (of which there are more). In addition, Moore's Law has also brought more abundant, cheap, powerful, and (unfortunately) compromisable end devices on to the Internet at a rate that meets (and o en outpaces) our remediation infrastructure. Even scrubbing centers cannot expect to keep up with the growing edge-capacity of increasingly well provisioned compromised hosts (bots) . is is what frames the asymmetry and ultimate impedance mismatch of DDoS: there are large numbers of a ack sources that can arbitrarily send a ack traffic, and which are being triaged by central remediation infrastructures. What's more, a ack sources are (almost by necessity) far from where we remediate their aggregate a acks. is leads to congested transit-links, which in turn leads to unobserved (and unobservable) disruption in the network, as a ack traffic accumulates on its way to victims.
What would help: With the many types of DDoS, the multiple TTPs, the diverse topologies of routed infrastructure, and more, it is easy to classify the problem-space as problematically complex. We argue that now is a critical time to embrace a principled approach to identifying the architectural features that have made DDoS a acks so relatively easy to launch. We believe that what is needed are investigations into what fundamentals enable and exacerbate DDoS. A foundational understanding of this would jumpstart determining what protections are needed, the possibility (or not) for incrementally deployable solutions, and what operational plans can be effective. One core observation is that combating the distributed nature of DDoS from even relatively centralized vantage points misaligns many core aspects of the nature of DDoS, and enabling remediations at the edge (where a acking nodes reside) seems to address a fundamental aspect of the overall problem. Approaches along these lines seem to have the potential to effectively address the scaling problems of volumetric a acks. However, given that a acks capitalize on application-level semantics, operationally viable solutions which can be effectuated in the network requires providing the network layer with information about application semantics -a requirement which conflicts with today's TCP/IP layered stack.
Existing Approaches: In considering how to push remediations into the network, there are some approaches being a empted now. As discussed in Section 2, FlowSpec, RTBH, and dots all attempt flavors of pushing semantics into the network to try and bolster a distributed defense. In addition to these, to address source address spoofing, two Best Common Practices (BCPs) exist to inform network operators how to configure their networks to no allow out-bound, or in-bound, spoofed packets [7, 14] . While a great deal of a ention has been paid to ge ing these deployed, there has been relatively li le success (as evidenced by the scale of recent reflector a acks [4, 20, 25] ). A principled inspection of this might suggest that the reason for limited deployment stems from the misalignment of costs and benefits. at is, since the costs of deploying are not aligned with incentives (i.e. those DDoS victims who benefit from deployment are not the network providers who have to deploy and pay if there is a misconfiguration). Indeed, this has been noted in operational communities as well, " e costs . . . not directly [being] borne by the potential beneficiaries of deploying the solution" [17] .
Another observation is that since source-address spoofing is related to the inter-domain routing system, should it be mitigated by security protections at that layer? Today, inter-domain routing security is being addressed by a relatively new set of standards called the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [23] . However, this approach (and its dependent technologies) do not address the data-plane, and focus only on IP address allocation and potentially some aspects of BGP's control-plane (which has no relationship to source-address spoofing).
Other DDoS defense approaches proposed to enhance the network (like the Traffic Validation Architecture (TVA) [39] , Pushback [19] , etc.) also aim to address remediations by using the network, but need operational network deployment in order to be effective. As with BCP-38 and BCP-84, deployment of these (and similar technologies) have not materialized. As with BCP-38 and BCP-84, incentives are not aligned with those paying costs for deployment.
DISCUSSION
Have we made fundamental enhancements to our DDoS defenses in the last 20 years? e landscape of cheap, compromisable, bots has only become more fertile to miscreants, and more damaging to Internet service operators. Increases in bandwidth have been shared by Internet services and a acking bots, but have been multiplied by a asymmetric scaling factor for compromised nodes (there's just more of them). Our applications have become more complex and even our security and privacy protections (like TLS, HTTPS, etc.) have made DDoS harder to mitigate in the network. We need a principled approach to this problem, basic research on ways to bridge an asymmetric gap, incentive models that align costs with benefits, and novel insights that today's operators can use. As a starting point for discussions, we posit that using the network to mount a distributed defense is the right basic approach, and those defense technologies that undercut the network properties that DDoS is built on, and reward early adoptors (economically, qualitatively, or in other palpable ways) are going to be key to changing the tide of our war on DDoS. is is a call to action: the research community is our best hope and best qualified to take up this call.
